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Cybersecurity: Recognizing the Risk and Protecting
Against Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2014, JPMorgan Chase (“JPMorgan”) CEO Jamie
Dimon warned that even though in 2014 alone the company would
spend $250 million and assign 1,000 people to addressing cybersecurity
issues, the protections still may not be enough to protect the company
from cyberattack.1 Dimon’s fears came to fruition just months later
when JPMorgan and at least twelve other financial institutions2 became
victims of a series of coordinated hacking attacks.3
In the cyberattack on JPMorgan, hackers accessed the bank’s
network through a JPMorgan employee’s personal computer.4 From
there, hackers infiltrated the bank’s computer systems and gained access
to over ninety of the bank’s servers.5 From June to August of 2014, the
attack went undetected, and hackers accessed JPMorgan’s network
through a security flaw on one of the bank’s websites.6 Similar to other
1. Doug Carroll, Banks Admit Growing Cyberattack Risks, USA TODAY (Aug. 28,
2014, 4:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/28/banksgrowing-cyber-security-risks/14741653/.
2. Andy Peters, Morning Scan: Cyberattacks Spread; Geithner and ‘Loan Sharky’,
BANKER
(Oct.
10,
2014,
9:00
AM),
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/morning-scan-cyberattacks-spread-geithnerand-loan-sharky-1070431-1.html (“Others in the hackers’ crosshairs may have included
mutual fund giant Fidelity Investments, online brokerage E*Trade Financial, payroll giant
Automatic Data Processing and banks Citigroup, Regions Financial and HSBC.”).
3. Nicole Perlroth, JPMorgan and Other Banks Struck by Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/technology/hackers-target-banks-includingjpmorgan.html?_r=0.
4. Emily Glazer & Danny Yadron, J.P. Morgan Says About 76 Million Households
Affected byCyber
Breach, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:32 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-says-about-76-million-households-affected-bycyber-breach-1412283372.
5. Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., JPMorgan Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million
Households,
N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(Oct.
2,
2014,
12:50
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/.
6. Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley, JPMorgan Hack Said to Span Months via
Multiple Flaws,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
29,
2014,
8:54
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-29/jpmorgan-hack-said-to-span-months-viamultiple-flaws.html.
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recent attacks, the attack on JPMorgan involved a message that tricked
customers into clicking on a false link that appeared to be a secure link
from JPMorgan.7 For over a decade, cybercriminals have been using
this technique, known as “phishing,” to steal customers’ identification
and account information through a fake website or email.8 The
JPMorgan attack, however, included new technical elements as well.9
When customers clicked the link, the hackers not only accessed
JPMorgan’s systems through the fake login page, they also installed
malware on the users’ computers that could help them hack into other
institutions.10
By infiltrating over ninety of JPMorgan’s servers, hackers
obtained “high-level administrative privileges in the systems” and
accessed customer accounts.11 The attack on JPMorgan compromised
or even lost a large number of sensitive data files.12 While no evidence
existed of fraudulent activity pertaining to the data breach, the
compromised data consisted of customers’ contact information,
including names, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses.13 The
attack affected an estimated 76 million households and 7 million
businesses.14 In the months following the attack, regulators and
prosecutors, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the
National Security Agency (“NSA”), the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”), the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, and New
York’s Department of Financial Services (“DFS”), began to investigate
7. Joseph Steinberg, Why You Are at Risk of Phishing Attacks (and Why JP Morgan
Chase Customers Were Targeted Last Week), FORBES (Aug. 25, 2014, 8:31 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2014/08/25/why-you-are-at-risk-of-phishingattacks-and-why-jp-morgan-chase-customers-were-targeted-this-week/.
8. See Avivah Litan & John Pescatore, What to Do Right Now About Phishing, AM.
BANKER, May 21, 2004, at 11 (defining “phishing” as “using fake e-mails and Web sites to
steal account and ID information” and suggesting that phishing was a threat to online
banking in 2004).
9. Steinberg, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Nicole Perlroth & Matthew Goldstein, After Breach, JPMorgan Still Seeks to
(Sept.
12,
2014),
Determine
Extent
of
Attack,
N.Y.
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/technology/after-breach-jpmorgan-still-seeks-todetermine-extent-of-attack.html?_r=0.
12. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, FBI Said to Examine Whether Russia Tied to
(Aug.
27,
2014,
5:04
PM),
JPMorgan
Hacking,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-27/fbi-said-to-be-probing-whether-russia-tied-tojpmorgan-hacking.html.
13. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 2, 2014).
14. Id.
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and analyze the breadth of the attack and the motive behind it.15
While historically regulators only responded to security
incidents after they occurred, recently regulators at both the federal and
state level intensified their scrutiny of financial services companies’
cybersecurity preparedness.16 The Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) conducted cybersecurity examinations of more than fifty
broker-dealers in 2014.17
The Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (“FFIEC”) conducted cybersecurity assessments
of 500 community banks.18 The State of New York conducted targeted
cybersecurity preparedness assessments of the banks it regulates.19
Additionally, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)
sent letters to roughly twenty broker-dealers seeking information on
how they manage cybersecurity threats.20
Federal and state agencies also suggested ways for financial
institutions to protect against cyberattacks.21 For example, in June
2013, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) hosted a
webinar to educate community banks on cybersecurity standards.22 In
addition, in 2014 the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) created the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity (“Framework”).23 The Framework aims to help guide
industries as they improve their cybersecurity efforts24 by identifying
15. Emily Glazer et al., Hackers May Have Targeted at Least 13 Firms, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 8, 2014, 9:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-regions-financial-e-tradeadp-saw-traffic-linked-to-j-p-morgan-hackers-1412783395.
16. Sanford Reback, Financial Industry in the Cyber Crosshairs: BGOV Analysis, 15
Computer Tech L. Rep. (BNA), No. 16, at 411, 411 (Aug. 15, 2014).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, In Call to Action, Treasury Secretary
Lew Urges U.S. Financial Sector To Redouble Efforts Against Cyber Threats (July 16,
2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2571.aspx.
22. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Holds Web
Conference for Community Banks on Cyber Threats (June 12, 2013),
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-occ-2013-96.html.
23. The NIST Framework is the guidance created in response to Executive Order
13636. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY
1
(2014),
available
at
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.
The
Framework is meant to assist organizations in managing cybersecurity risk. Id.
24. Joe Adler, Banking Groups Hail New Federal Cybersecurity Steps, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 13, 2014, at 20.
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best practices for cybersecurity protection and creating a common
mechanism to evaluate and discuss those practices.25
Despite regulatory pressure and financial institutions’ efforts to
protect against security threats, sophisticated cyberattacks against
financial institutions occur every day, and the resulting costs have
become part of the business.26 While data breaches and cyberattacks
were once just a possibility to financial institutions and other
businesses, the question has evolved from a matter of “whether” to
the
“when.”27 Even with regulators paying more attention to
28
cyberthreats facing financial institutions, the threat to an institution’s
reputation and the possibility of losing customers’ trust should motivate
financial institutions to proactively improve their cybersecurity
infrastructure.29
As the risk of cyberattacks increases, banks, both large and
small, should use the newly available guidance to identify weaknesses
in their infrastructure and develop a proactive security posture.30 This
Note proceeds in six parts. Part II details the mechanics behind
cyberattacks.31 Part III identifies the effects of cyberattacks on financial
institutions.32 Part IV discusses the legal liability of financial
institutions following a cyberattack.33 Part V evaluates regulatory
efforts to increase cybersecurity requirements and prevent
cyberattacks.34 Part VI suggests solutions financial institutions may use
to protect against cyberattacks.35 Finally, Part VII concludes by
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 23, at 1.
Mike Snider & Kevin Johnson, New Cyberattack on Banks ‘Very Sophisticated’,
(Aug.
28,
2014),
7:55
PM),
USA
TODAY
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/28/jpmorgan-chase-bank
hack/14730183/.
27. Elizabeth E. McGinn et al., The Board of Directors and Cybersecurity: Setting up
the Right Structure, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 458, 458 (Aug. 26, 2014).
28. Rachel Witkowski, Policymakers Preaching About Cybersecurity, But Are Banks
Listening?, AM. BANKER, July 1, 2013, at 7.
29. Jackie Stewart, Cybersecurity Threats Demand Small-Bank Directors’ Attention,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 27, 2014, at 4.
30. Earl Crane, Cybersecurity Framework Can Help Banks Address Increased
BANKER
(Feb.
26,
2014,
10:00
AM),
Regulatory
Scrutiny,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/cybersecurity-framework-can-help-banksaddress-regulatory-scrutiny-1065839-1.html.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part V.
35. See infra Part VI.
25.
26.
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emphasizing the importance of financial institutions using the available
guidance to make sure that their networks are sufficiently protected.36
II. HOW CYBERATTACKS OCCUR
Cybercriminals can access computer systems and business
networks in a variety of ways.37 The most common methods include
phishing, malware, and accessing the unsecure networks of third-party
vendors.38
A.

Phishing

Phishing is when a cybercriminal sends an email, text, or pop-up
message asking for personal or financial information.39 A phishing
message may say something like, “We suspect an unauthorized
transaction on your account. To ensure that your account is not
compromised, please click the link below and confirm your identity.”40
The goal of a phishing message is to deceive the recipient into believing
that the message comes from a legitimate business and entering
personal information based on their belief.41 Once the recipient
provides the information, the hacker can then use the information to
commit fraud.42 The attack on JPMorgan included a phishing campaign
targeting JPMorgan customers.43 JPMorgan customers received emails
that appeared to be from JPMorgan instructing the recipient to click a
link.44 Once a recipient clicked on the link, the security of the user’s
computer was compromised.45
See infra Part VII.
KASPERSKY LAB, GLOBAL IT SECURITY RISKS 2014 – ONLINE FINANCIAL FRAUD
PREVENTION
1,
10
(2014),
available
at
http://media.kaspersky.com/en/IT_Security_Risks_Survey_2014_Financial_Security_report.
pdf?_ga=1.34870177.1093389152.1412952265.
38. Id.
39. Phishing, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 2011), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/
0003-phishing.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Smash & Grab Campaign Targets JP Morgan Chase Customers, PROOFPOINT,
http://www.proofpoint.com/threatinsight/posts/smash-and-grab-jpmorgan.php (last visited
Jan. 8, 2015).
44. Id.
45. Id.
36.
37.
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Malware

After phishing compromises a user’s computer, cybercriminals
can install malware.46 Cybercriminals can install malware, short for
“malicious software,” on computers, smart phones, or other mobile
devices without the owner’s consent.47 Once malware is installed,
cybercriminals can monitor and control online activity, steal
confidential information, and commit fraud.48 In the JPMorgan attack,
after a customer clicked the phishing link, the hackers installed malware
on the user’s computer.49 By installing the malware, hackers accessed
JPMorgan’s computer network, including servers that contained
customers’ personal information.50
C.

Third-Party Vendors

Financial institutions often use third-party vendors such as law
firms, accounting firms, marketing firms, maintenance companies, and
janitorial companies for necessary services.51 Some of these third
parties’ security practices are remiss or even nonexistent.52 As a result,
even if cybercriminals cannot directly breach a financial institution’s
network, they may still gain access to the institution’s network through
the network of a third-party vendor.53 For example, in the 2013 attack
on Target (“Target Breach”), cybercriminals accessed Target’s
computer system through the security system of a heating and cooling
contractor who was working for Target.54 Once the cybercriminals
accessed Target’s network through the third-party vendor, they were
able to install malware on the company’s computer servers and steal
46. Malware, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2014), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/
0011-malware.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Smash & Grab Campaign Targets JP Morgan Chase Customers, supra note 43.
50. Glazer & Yadron, supra note 4.
51. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Matthew Goldstein, After JPMorgan Chase Breach,
Push to Close Wall St. Security Gaps, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 21, 2014, 4:57 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/after-jpmorgan-cyberattack-a-push-to-fortify-wallstreet-banks/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
52. See id. (“In attack after attack, hackers are rebuffed by financial institutions, only
to slip through the cracks at vendors, including some that have virtually no security.”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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confidential credit and debit card data as well as Target customers’
personal information.55
III. EFFECT OF CYBERATTACKS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
When a data breach occurs, the cost falls onto American
consumers and their financial institutions.56 Depending on the size of
the breached company, the cost of a single data breach can range
anywhere from $66,000 to $938,000 per organization.57 The cost of a
breach includes actual fraud losses, the price of reissuing cards, loss of
customers, the burden on customer service, and fees paid to consultants
and lawyers who banks hire to manage the problem.58 Another cost for
the breached institution, though difficult to quantify, involves the strain
put on employees’ productivity following a data breach. 59
The National Association of Federal Credit Unions estimated
that the 2013 Target Breach60 cost the financial institutions of affected
customers a combined $480 million in fraud loss, reimbursement costs,
card replacement costs, operational costs, and other associated
expenses.61 After the Target Breach, an American Bankers Association
survey found that the loss per fraudulently used debit card averaged
$331 while the loss per credit card was $530.62 Customers are not liable
for paying these fraudulent charges and reissue costs.63 Instead, the
55. Elizabeth A. Harris et al., A Sneaky Path into Target Customers’ Wallets, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A1.
56. Carrie Hunt, Retailers Should Be Held to Stricter Standards on Data Security, AM.
BANKER (Aug. 27, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/retailersshould-be-held-to-stricter-standards-on-data-security-1069613-1.html.
57. The cost depends on the size of the institution. Penny Crosman, How Much Do
Data Breaches Cost? Two Studies Attempt a Tally, AM. BANKER, Sept. 12, 2014, at 4. The
smaller amount corresponds to smaller institutions and the bigger amount corresponds to
larger institutions. Id. However, larger institutions tend to have economies of scale that
make the cost per customer lower for larger institutions than for smaller institutions. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The Target Breach began “with a malware-laced email phishing attack sent to
employees at an HVAC firm” that Target used as a third-party vendor. Target Hackers
Broke in Via HVAC Company, KREBS ON SEC. (Feb. 5, 2014, 1:52 PM),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-via-hvac-company/.
61. Hunt, supra note 56.
62. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, TARGET BREACH IMPACT SURVEY 10 (July 2014), available at
http://www.aba.com/Tools/Function/Payments/Documents/TargetBreachBankImpact.pdf.
63. Press Release, Target, Target Provides Update on Data Breach and Financial
Performance (Jan. 10, 2014), http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-provides-update-ondata-breach-and-financial-performance.
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burden falls on banks to pay the costs and then seek reimbursement
from merchants.64
Reissuing debit and credit cards following a data breach also
creates expenses for banks.65 For large banks,66 reissuing a new debit
card costs about $2.70 while reissuing a new credit card costs about
$2.99.67 For small banks,68 however, reissuing a new debit card costs
about $11 while reissuing a new credit card costs about $12.75.69 Small
banks incur higher costs because they must reissue all potentially
affected cards as a precaution, whereas large banks have resources such
as contact centers that can actively monitor potentially affected cards
and reissue only those that are fraudulently used.70 In addition, large
banks’ economies of scale help lower the per-unit cost of replacing each
fraudulently used card.71
Even when banks receive reimbursement from a merchant
following a breach, the amount reimbursed usually does not cover the
total cost of the breach, including card reissuance and fraud loss.72 In
breaches that occurred between 2009 and 2014, less than 34% of all
banks received any amount of reimbursement; 100% of large banks
received at least some reimbursement following a data breach,
compared to only 25% of small banks.73 Even still, the majority of
banks that received any sort of reimbursement received less than ten
cents per dollar, and even worse, almost 50% of banks received less
than one cent per dollar.74
Breaches also impact consumers.75 When a breach occurs,
64. Lawrence Delevingne, Banks May Take Their Pound of Flesh from Target over
Breach, NBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/businessnews/banks-may-take-their-pound-flesh-target-over-breach-f2D11794859.
65. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 5–16.
66. For purposes of the study, large banks were defined as banks with more than $50
billion in assets. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Small banks were defined as banks with less than $1 billion in assets. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 11. (“Included are costs for mailing, card stock, and additional staff
resources, etc. Because many respondents were unable to track additional staff time spent to
respond to customer inquiries and to monitor and prevent fraud related to the Target breach,
the reissue costs reported here are conservative, baseline figures.”).
70. Crosman, supra note 57.
71. Id.
72. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 20.
73. Id. at 18–19.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id. at 13–14.
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customers, especially those who possess only one card, are
inconvenienced when they must wait for a replacement card before they
can make purchases.76 Additionally, following a breach, customers face
an increased risk of fraud and future identity theft.77 Thus, a company’s
failure to protect against a data breach results in lost business, which
could ultimately negatively affect the company’s valuation.78
A financial institution’s data breach may result in a loss of both
individual and business customers.79 Although customers do not always
cite a data breach as their reason for leaving a bank,80 research
conducted by SafeNet, Inc. found that 80% of individual customers
were at least somewhat unlikely to do business with a company that
experienced a data breach of financial information.81 Further, a study
conducted by the Kaspersky Lab found that 60% of personal customers
opted for an online store or financial services provider that offers
safeguards for protecting financial information, and 75% of customers
would prefer to have all of their devices protected by their banks against
online financial fraud.82 Similarly, a separate study conducted by the
Kaspersky Lab concluded that almost half of businesses changed banks
after security breaches compromised their accounts.83 Of the businesses
surveyed, 82% admitted that they would consider leaving a bank that
suffered a breach.84 Thus, data breaches cause customers to lose trust in
breached companies.85
Following a breach, the biggest cost to financial institutions is
arguably the burden on customer service.86 Within twenty-four hours of
Id.
Letter from Tim Pawlenty, President and CEO, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to
Members of Congress (Jan. 27, 2014), available at http://fsroundtable.org/open-lettercongress-cybersecurity-01-27-14/.
78. Global Survey Reveals Impact of Data Breaches on Customer Loyalty, SAFENET,
http://www2.safenet-inc.com/email/2014/dp/GlobalCustomerSentiment/index.html#1918
(last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
79. Crosman, supra note 57.
80. Id.
81. Global Survey, supra note 78.
82. KASPERSKY LAB, CONSUMER SECURITY RISKS SURVEY 2014: MULTI-DEVICE
THREATS IN A MULTI-DEVICE WORLD 22
(July 2014), available at
http://media.kaspersky.com/en/Kaspersky_Lab_Consumer_Security_Risks_Survey_2014_E
NG.pdf.
83. Crosman, supra note 57.
84. Global IT Security Risks 2014, supra note 37, at 14.
85. Global Survey, supra note 78.
86. Crosman, supra note 57.
76.
77.
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learning of a breach, some banks begin calling customers to notify
them.87 While some banks use third-party vendors to handle these calls
at call centers, at some small and mid-size banks, the burden falls on
bank employees.88 Each of these customer service calls can cost up to
$20.89 Even for banks that use third-party vendors, each call can cost as
much as replacing the card.90 In addition to calls, banks also draft and
send letters to customers regarding the breach.91 If customers become
aware of the breach by the media or other outside sources, they will call
the bank inquiring about unauthorized transactions or requesting a new
card.92 When breaches occur, bank employees and call centers can
become overwhelmed, which may hinder the bank’s normal operations
and its customer service center’s ability to provide assistance.93 After
the Target Breach, for example, at least one bank reported that
employees were removed from performing their usual duties to assist
with customer service and notification procedures.94 Following a
breach, employees may get fired, and, in the most severe instances, the
morale of an organization may never recover.95
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FOLLOWING A CYBERATTACK
When a data breach occurs, companies can expect lawsuits for
negligence, breach of contract, and violation of state laws including
deceptive trade practices acts or data breach notification laws.96 These
suits can also result in personal liability for the directors of the bank.97
When a cybersecurity breach harms customers, affected
customers may likely bring negligence claims against the institution.98
87. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 14.
88. Id. at 13–14.
89. Crosman, supra note 57.
90. As a reminder, the cost to reissue a card can range from $2.70 to $12.75 per

customer. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 14.
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id. at 14.
93. Crosman, supra note 57.
94. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 62, at 13.
95. Crosman, supra note 57.
96. Kimberly Peretti, Cyber Threat Intelligence: To Share or Not to Share—What Are
the Real Concerns, Banking Daily (BNA), Issue No. 173 (Sept. 8, 2014).
97. McGinn et al., supra note 27, at 461.
98. Joe Adler, Why Obama’s ‘Voluntary’ Cybersecurity Plan May Prove Mandatory,
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After a Home Depot data breach in 2014 compromised the personal
information of 56 million customers, the company faced at least fifteen
lawsuits alleging that Home Depot acted negligently by failing to
adequately secure the customers’ personal and financial information.99
When faced with negligence claims, institutions must show that their
cybersecurity procedures are “commercially reasonable.”100 The
reasonableness standard is subjective, and although the Framework is
not a requirement for institutions, courts are likely to use it to determine
reasonable industry practices.101 Thus, if an institution’s cybersecurity
practices do not align with the Framework, the institution must prove
that its practices are nevertheless reasonable.102
Financial institutions may also face breach of contract suits in
which customers allege that the institution contractually promised to
protect the customer’s personal information and then breached that
promise.103 In a class action lawsuit against eBay in 2014, plaintiffs
alleged breach of contract based on the terms of the company’s privacy
policy, as well as breach of implied contract based on customers’
disclosure of information in reliance on the company’s stated privacy
policy to protect against data breaches.104 At least one court held that a
company’s privacy policy or other statements made by the company
assuring the security of customers’ data does not constitute a contractual
promise to safeguard data.105 However, another court recognized that
an implied contractual relationship may exist when a customer uses a
credit or debit card at a company and expects that the company will
protect its personal information.106 Because of this undecided legal

AM. BANKER, Feb. 18, 2014, at 15.
99. Amanda Bronstad, Lawsuits Piling Up in Home Depot Data Security Breach, THE
NAT’L L. J. (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202671405651
/Lawsuits-Piling-Up-in-Home-Depot-Data-Security-Breach.
100. Adler, supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. DOUGLAS H. MEAL & DAVID T. COHEN, PRIVATE DATA SECURITY BREACH
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, in PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE LEGAL ISSUES: LEADING
LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING CHANGES IN SECURITY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND HELPING
CLIENTS PREVENT BREACHES 11–12 (Aspatore 2014).
104. Complaint-Class Action ¶¶ 67–87, Collin Green, v. eBay, Inc. (E.D. La 2014) (No.
2:14-cv-01677-SM-KWR).
105. In re Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00325-RCJ, 2013 WL 4830497, at *3 (D.
Nev. Sept. 9, 2013).
106. Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 2011).
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issue, customers may continue to allege both express and implied
breach of contract claims when companies fail to reasonably protect
customers’ private information.107
When data breaches violate state laws, both the company as a
whole and individual board members may be held liable108 under
deceptive trade practice acts and data breach notification statutes.109
For example, when First National Bank of Nebraska refused to refund
fees for unauthorized purchases following a data breach, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska held that the bank’s
customers had a claim under Nebraska’s Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.110 Additionally, almost all states have enacted security
breach notification statutes that the state’s attorney general can use to
bring lawsuits against companies that fail to protect against
cyberattacks.111 Absent a federal data breach notification
law,
companies must comply with the requirements of state data breach
notification statutes, which sometimes contradict each other.112 Ten
states, including North Carolina,113 have statutes that explicitly allow
private rights of action in addition to potential suits brought by the state
attorney general.114 Thus, after a breach, a single company may face
many lawsuits for noncompliance with data breach notification
statutes.115
Finally, when a cyberattack results in a drop in a public
company’s share price, shareholders may bring derivative suits against
the company if it failed to adequately protect against cyberattacks.116
When breaches compromise sensitive information, customers lose

Meal & Cohen, supra note 103, at 11–12.
McGinn et al., supra note 27, at 461.
Peretti, supra note 96.
Wines, Vines and Corks, LLC v. First Nat’l of Nebraska, No. 8:14-cv-00082-LESFG3 (D. Neb. Aug. 20, 2014).
111. McGinn et al., supra note 27, at 461.
112. Reid J. Schar & Kathleen W. Gibbons, Complicated Compliance: State Data
Breach Notification Laws, 12 Privacy & Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1381, 1381 (Aug.
12, 2013).
113. States explicitly allowing a private right of action include: Alaska, California,
Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 1384.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. McGinn et al., supra note 27, at 461–62.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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confidence and some may change providers.117 As a result of this
reputational damage, stock prices may drop and shareholders may
sue.118 OCC officials have warned that in order to avoid potential
company and personal liability, bank boards of directors and managers
must maintain adequate cybersecurity policies and practices at their
institutions.119 Boards of directors and managers should be involved in
and regularly briefed about the company’s cybersecurity efforts to avoid
becoming an easy target for such derivative suits.120
V. FEDERAL AND STATE EFFORTS TO INCREASE CYBERSECURITY
REQUIREMENTS AND PREVENT CYBERATTACKS
As cybersecurity has become increasingly important to the
financial industry, government officials and agencies are instituting
requirements and providing guidance to help improve cybersecurity
policies and protect against future attacks.121
A.

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) Safeguards
Rule, financial institutions122 have an affirmative duty to protect
consumers’ personal information.123 Specifically, “each financial
institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the
privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality
of those customers’ non-public personal information.”124 Financial
institutions must “establish appropriate standards . . . relating to
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to insure the security
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 461.
Id. at 461–62.
Rachel Witkowski, Regulators Offer Cybersecurity Guidance to Small Banks, AM.
BANKER, June 13, 2013, at 21.
120. McGinn et al., supra note 27, at 461–62.
121. Cybersecurity Is Everyone’s Business, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 9,
2013), http://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-everyones-business.
122. “Financial institutions” under the GLBA include national banks, Federal branches
and Federal agencies of foreign banks, member banks of the Federal Reserve System, and
banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 527(4), 113 Stat. 1338, 1449 (1999) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 6827(4) (2012)).
123. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 501(a), 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a).
124. Id.
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and confidentiality of customer records and information.”125 In
addition, they are required “to protect against any anticipated threats or
hazards to the security or integrity of such records; and to protect
against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any
customer.”126 To comply with GLBA’s requirements, financial
institutions must “develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive
information security program that . . . contains administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards that are appropriate to [the institution’s] size
and complexity, the nature and scope of [the institution’s] activities, and
the sensitivity of any customer information at issue.”127 Some states
have enacted legislation that extends the Safeguards Rule to state
chartered banks as well.128 A financial institution’s failure to comply
with the Safeguards Rule may result in charges by the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) and significant monetary and reputational
damages.129
B.

Proposed Legislation: Cyberintelligence Sharing and
Protection Act (“CISPA”) and National Cybersecurity and
Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2013

Over the last five years, almost 100 bills regarding cybersecurity
have been introduced in Congress.130 None of this proposed legislation,
however, has been enacted into law.131 While advocates of these bills
stressed a need for information sharing to strengthen the security of
computer networks, opponents, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) and other privacy advocates, feared that the bills did
not adequately protect Americans’ private information.132
125. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 501(b), 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
126. Id.
127. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2014).
128. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-44a (2012).
129. McGinn et al., supra note 27, at 460–61.
130. JAMES ARDEN BARNETT JR., RECENT TRENDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: LEADING

LAWYERS ON BALANCING US NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS,
in CYBER SECURITY: FIXING POLICY WITH NEW PRINCIPLES AND ORGANIZATION 3 (Aspatore
2014).
131. Id.
132. Ellen Nakashima, Senate Intelligence Panel Advances Cybersecurity Bill, THE
WASH.
POST
(July
8,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/07/08/senate-intelligence-panel-advances-cybersecurity-bill/.
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These efforts demonstrate that lawmakers recognize that issues
such as cybersecurity and protection against cyberthreats require
legislation, however nothing has yet been adopted.133 Since 2013, the
House of Representatives has advanced two bills regarding
cybersecurity: the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
(“CISPA”),134 which failed, and the National Cybersecurity and Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act (“NCCIP Act”),135 which was approved by
the Senate as the National Cybersecurity Protection Act in December
2014.136 The House of Representatives passed CISPA on April 18,
2013.137 CISPA intended “[t]o provide for the sharing of certain
[cyberthreat] intelligence and [cyberthreat] information between the
intelligence community and cybersecurity entities.”138 However, due to
privacy concerns over proposed exceptions to existing privacy laws, the
bill was not seriously considered in the Senate.139
Over a year later, in July 2014, the House of Representatives
approved the NCCIP Act,140 a bill that lays out security standards for
federal government systems and private-sector business considered
critical to the economy.141 Most importantly, the NCCIP Act differs
from CISPA in that it does not create exceptions to existing privacy
laws.142 Because of this change, some who opposed the CISPA, such as
133. Alina Selyukh, Senate Intelligence Committee Approves Cybersecurity Bill,
REUTERS (July 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/08/us-usa-cybersecuritycongress-idUSKBN0FD2LG20140708.
134. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. (2013–
2014).
135. National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2014, H.R.
3696, 113th Cong. (2013–2014).
136. Cory Bennett, Senate Passes DHS Cyber Bill, THE HILL (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:04 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/226639-senate-passes-dhs-cyber-bill.
137. McGinn et al., supra note 27, at 462.
138. H.R. 624.
139. Victoria Finkle, Why Cybersecurity Legislation Will Likely Come Up Short—
Again, AM. BANKER, May 28, 2013, at 12.
140. Press Release, U.S. H.R. Comm. on Homeland Security, House Passes Bipartisan
Legislation to Protect Critical Infrastructure From Cyber Attack (July 28, 2014),
http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/house-passes-bipartisan-legislation-protect-criticalinfrastructure-cyber-attack.
141. Maria Aspan, Bankers, When Talking Innovation, Dwell on Cyber Defenses, AM.
28,
2014,
7:14
PM),
BANKER (Mar.
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_60/bankers-when-talking-innovation-dwell-oncyber-defenses-1066558-1.html.
142. Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director of American Civil Liberties Union, to
Chairmen and Ranking Members of the U.S. H.R. (Jan. 14, 2014), available at
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/images/HR3696-ACLU.pdf.
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the ACLU, endorsed the NCCIP Act.143 On July 29, 2014, the bill was
referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs.144 If passed, this Act could significantly
improve cybersecurity by creating the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (“NCCIC”) to facilitate real-time
cyberthreat information-sharing across critical infrastructure sectors.145
It would also establish an equal partnership between private industry
and the DHS to facilitate critical infrastructure protection and incident
response following a cyberattack.146
C.

NIST Guidance

As legislative attempts failed, in February 2013, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13636 “to improve cybersecurity
information sharing and collaboratively develop and implement riskbased standards.”147 The Executive Order directed the NIST to create a
framework to reduce cyberrisks to the nation’s critical infrastructure.148
The Executive Order set out to strengthen the protections of critical
infrastructure against threats of cyberattack by developing industry best
practices.149 The Order aimed to create a voluntary program to
encourage financial firms, utility operators, and others who own and/or
operate critical infrastructure to share information with one another
about cyberthreats.150 The voluntary program intended to promote
standards that would reduce the risk of cybersecurity threats on facilities
vital to national security, the economy, or public health.151
After a yearlong process, the NIST created the Framework as a
compilation of industry best practices for managing cybersecurity
risks.152 The NIST designed the Framework to complement, rather than
143. Id.
144. H.R. 3696 (as passed by H.R., July 29, 2014).
145. Press Release, U.S. H.R. Comm. on Homeland Security, “National Cybersecurity

and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2013” (NCCIP Act) (July 29, 2014),
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/documents/12113_NCCIP_summ
ary.pdf.
146. Id.
147. Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 12. 2013).
148. Id. at 11741.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 11739.
151. Id.
152. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
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replace, an organization’s existing cybersecurity
program.153
Ultimately, the Framework aims to assist organizations, regardless of
size, degree of risk, or level of cybersecurity sophistication, in reducing
and better managing their cybersecurity risks.154
By establishing a set of best practices, the Framework aspires to
help financial institutions and other businesses set and reach their
cybersecurity risk management goals in a cost-effective way, but
without the increased burden of regulation.155 While not mandatory, the
Framework reflects current regulations and best practices of the
financial industry and also provides guidance on how cybersecurity
practices can be improved.156 Regulators will likely use the Framework
as a baseline when conducting future examinations and when updating
their own examination procedures and guidance.157
D.

OCC Guidance

The OCC’s June 2013 Semiannual Risk Perspective devoted an
entire section to addressing cyberthreats to banks of all sizes.158 The
report suggested that hackers might increasingly target smaller
institutions that they believe lack the resources necessary to protect
against cyberattacks.159 Nevertheless, the report still identified the
increasing volume and sophistication of cyberthreats as a key risk to
large banks.160 Recognizing cyberthreats as “the fastest-growing risk to
banks,” the OCC acknowledged that regulators currently think more in
terms of supervision than in terms of regulation.161
The focus of the OCC policies and supervision will vary based
INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY
11
(2014),
available
at
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.
153. Id. at 13.
154. Id.
155. Adler, supra note 24.
156. Id.
157. Crane, supra note 30.
158. NAT’L RISK COMM., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SEMIANNUAL
RISK PERSPECTIVE 7–10 (2013), available at http://www.occ.gov/publications/publicationsby-type/other-publications-reports/semiannual-risk-perspective/semiannual-riskperspective-fall-2013.pdf.
159. Id. at 7.
160. Id. at 9.
161. Rachel Witkowski, OCC Sees Cybersecurity as Fastest-Growing Risk to Banks,
AM. BANKER, June 19, 2013, at 9.
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on the size of the banks.162 For example, for small to mid-size banks,
the focus centers on strategic and capital planning, whereas for large
banks, the focus remains “on strengthening their governance, oversight
and operational risk issues.”163 Specifically, for large banks, the OCC
supervisory staff will review an institution’s existing threat assessment
and incident response programs as well as conduct vulnerability
assessments.164 The OCC also noted that the pace of new regulatory
requirements can cause increased risks for banks that do not adequately
invest in cybersecurity.165
In addition to the Risk Perspective, the OCC hosted a webinar,
attended by approximately 1,000 bankers, offering a basic course on
cybersecurity policies and procedures.166 The OCC explained that a
bank’s cybersecurity program should be integrated as part of its
information security and vendor management processes.167 The OCC
also stressed that in order to adequately address evolving threats, a
bank’s cybersecurity policies and practices must be monitored and
adjusted regularly.168
E.

DFS Cybersecurity Assessments169

In response to the growing risk of cyberattacks against financial
institutions, the New York DFS conducted an industry-wide survey on
cybersecurity practices.170 After completion of the survey in May 2014,
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced that because of the
growing risk of cyberattacks on New York banks, the DFS would begin
conducting targeted cybersecurity assessments to assist banks in
safeguarding personal bank records and protecting banks from

Id.
Id.
NAT’L RISK COMM., supra note 158, at 10.
Id. at 7.
Witkowski, supra note 119.
Id.
Id.
The DFS supervises banks, credit unions, and other financial institutions that are
chartered in New York State. Who We Supervise, DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS.,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/whowesupervise.htm.
170. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., REPORT ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE BANKING
SECTOR 1
(2014)
[hereinafter
DFS
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr140505_cyber_security.pdf.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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cyberbreaches.171 The new examinations will include
questions
regarding IT management and governance, incident response, network
security, vendor management, and disaster recovery.172 The DFS will
conduct the examinations on financial institutions, including statechartered banks, credit unions, and foreign banks whose U.S.
headquarters are located in New York.173 Each institution will be
graded on its cybersecurity readiness.174 Through the examinations, the
DFS aims to support banks and help improve cybersecurity by
encouraging banks to focus on their cybersecurity preparedness.175 DFS
serves as the first regulator to begin conducting regular, targeted
cybersecurity preparedness assessments of the banks it regulates.176
F.

FFIEC Guidance and Cybersecurity Assessments

In April 2014, FFIEC members177 issued a statement notifying
financial institutions of potential cyberattack risks and describing the
steps institutions should take to address the attacks.178 Then, in May
2014, the FFIEC announced plans to conduct cybersecurity risk
assessments of community banks179 to highlight areas for financial
institution managers and directors to focus on to mitigate cybersecurity
risks.180 These focus areas include building a security culture,
171. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Governor Cuomo Announces New Cyber
Security Assessments
for
Banks
(May
6,
2014),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1405061.htm [hereinafter DFS Press Release].
172. DFS REPORT, supra note 170.
173. Penny Crosman, N.Y. Regulators Plan Heightened Scrutiny of Banks’ Cyber
Readiness, AM. BANKER, May 8, 2014, at 7.
174. Id.
175. DFS Press Release, supra note 171.
176. Crosman, supra note 174.
177. The FFIEC consists of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, the
Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
FIN.
INSTS.
EXAMINATION
COUNCIL,
Regulatory
Agencies,
FED.
https://www.ffiec.gov/agencies.htm.
178. Advisory Letter, Fed. Fin. Insts. Examinations Counsel, Financial Regulators
Release Statements on Cyber-Attacks on Automated Teller Machine and Card Authorization
Systems and Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr040214.htm.
179. Penny Crosman, First Look: FFIEC Explains New Cybersecurity Assessments, AM.
BANKER, May 9, 2014, at 13.
180. Press Release, Federal Fin. Insts. Examination Council, FFIEC Promotes
Cybersecurity Preparedness for Community Financial Institutions (May 7, 2014),
http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr050714.htm [hereinafter FFIEC Press Release].
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identifying and monitoring risks, developing risk management
processes, creating awareness and accountability, and ensuring reports
to management about the institution’s potential vulnerability.181 The
assessments also include examinations of the policies that community
banks currently use to detect vulnerability and protect against risks.182
The reviews focus on five key areas of cybersecurity preparedness:183
(1) risk management and oversight; (2) threat intelligence and
collaboration; (3) cybersecurity controls; (4) external dependency
management; and (5) incident management and resilience.184
Like the Framework, the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment does
not create new requirements for financial institutions.185 Instead of
functioning as a standalone test, the program is designed to be
incorporated into the already-existing community bank examinations
and to assist the relevant federal regulators in developing a baseline
assessment of how banks manage cyberrisks.186 The assessments are
primarily meant to assist authorities in examining cybersecurity
preparedness programs at small and mid-size banks that do not have
access to all of the resources available to big banks.187 The FFIEC’s
goal in conducting the assessments is to make sure that regulated
financial institutions adequately manage cybersecurity risks based on
their complexity and risk profile.188 The assessment’s identification of
gaps in cybersecurity practices will help the FFIEC make informed
decisions about future actions189 and assist supervisors and regulators in
making informed decisions to protect against cyberrisks.190
Additionally, the assessments are designed to help FFIEC member
institutions learn about the state of cybersecurity across community
institutions and prioritize actions that should be taken.191 Bank boards
Id.
Kristin Broughton, FFIEC Announces Plans for Cybersecurity Assessments, AM.
BANKER, May 8, 2014, at 12.
183. Joe Adler, How Regulators Are Shaking Up Small Bank Cyber Reviews, AM.
BANKER, June 30, 2014, at 9.
184. FED. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL’S CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT 1 (2014).
185. Adler, supra note 183.
186. Crosman, supra note 179.
187. Adler, supra note 183.
188. Crosman, supra note 179.
189. Id.
190. Adler, supra note 183.
191. FFIEC Press Release, supra note 180.
181.
182.
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and management should embrace these assessments as ways to identify
gaps in current practices and prepare their institution for the possibility
of a cyberattack.192
FFIEC agencies conducted its first Cybersecurity Assessments
on 500 community banks during the summer of 2014.193 Overall, the
assessments found that while the level of risk varies greatly across the
financial industry, understanding the threats and techniques attackers
use will help management identify, assess, and mitigate each financial
institution’s specific risks.194 For example, institutions that grant
employees access to the bank’s network from their personal devices risk
exposing their financial institution to malware.195 The assessments also
found that most financial institutions understand the need to educate
employees about cybersecurity risk management, maintain event logs to
understand a cyberattack after it occurs, have a process
for
implementing corrective controls to address previously identified
vulnerabilities, and have disaster recovery plans for when incidents
occur.196 As a result of the Assessments’ findings, FFIEC members
must review and update current guidance to financial institutions to
align it with the changing cybersecurity risk.197
In addition to the Assessments, a webpage launched by the
FFIEC in June 2014 offers further guidance and features information
about the Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Working Group
created in June 2013, a handbook about the FFIEC examinations, and a
May 2014 webinar and video on cybersecurity for community bank
CEOs.198 These resources endeavor to assist managers and directors in
understanding expectations, assessing the risks of their institution, and
mitigating against those risks.199

Adler, supra note 183.
JOHN E. BOWMAN ET AL., VENABLE LLP, FINANCIAL SERVICES ALERT: FFIEC
CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT: SENIOR MANAGEMENT MUST TAKE THE LEAD (Nov. 12,
2014), http://www.venable.com/ffiec-cybersecurity-assessment—senior-management-musttake-the-lead/.
194. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT GENERAL
OBSERVATIONS 4 (2014).
195. Id. at 1.
196. Id. at 4.
197. Id.
198. Cybersecurity
Awareness,
FED.
FIN.
INSTS.
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COUNCIL,
https://www.ffiec.gov/cybersecurity.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
199. Id.
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VI. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
While financial institutions continue to develop strategies to
identify and protect against cybersecurity risks, still more can be done
to mitigate the risks.200 People, whether consumers or employees, often
serve as the weak link in security.201 For example, in the JPMorgan
breach, hackers used the personal computer of an employee who was
working from home to access the bank’s network.202 Similarly, in the
Target Breach, hackers breached Target’s system using credentials
stolen from an employee of the company’s vendor.203
Educating employees and consumers on how to distinguish
legitimate entities from fraudulent ones is key to protecting against
phishing attacks.204 For example, financial institutions should educate
customers about the possible consequences of clicking on links or
opening attachments in unsolicited emails.205 To prevent customers
from becoming a victim to these emails, financial institutions should
teach their customers that banks and merchants will never ask for
personal or financial information via email.206 In addition, financial
institutions should instruct customers that if they receive emails or
phone calls from someone claiming to work for their bank, they should
contact the bank directly to find out whether the institution actually
requested the information.207 Despite the fact that the Target Breach
occurred through a third-party vendor, Target, recognizing the risk and
the importance of customer education, announced plans to launch a $5
million, multiyear campaign to educate customers about cybersecurity
risks, including the dangers of phishing scams.208
200. Penny Crosman, A Tiny Bit of Solace for Banks in Home Depot Breach, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 10, 2014, at 1.
201. Penny Crosman, Hacker Attack on Banks Shows Need to Lock Down Employee
PCs, AM. BANKER, Aug. 29, 2014, at 8.
202. Id.
203. Danny Yadron, Paul Ziobro & Charles Levinson, Target Hackers Used Stolen
ST.
J.
(Jan.
29,
2014,
7:08
PM),
Vendor
Credentials,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303973704579350722480135220.
204. Steinberg, supra note 7.
205. Id.
206. Annamaria Andriotis, There’s a Big Data Risk for Bank Customers—And It’s Not
What You Think, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Aug. 29, 2014, 8:32 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2014/08/29/theres-a-big-data-risk-for-bank-customers-andits-not-what-you-think/.
207. Id.
208. Press Release, Target, Target Invests $5 Million in Cybersecurity Coalition (Feb.
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One resource available for customer education is the FTC’s
Consumer Information website that provides “Examples of Phishing
Messages,” “How to Deal with Phishing Scams,” and “Action Steps” to
avoid a phishing attack.209 The website advises consumers to neither
not reply to online solicitations that ask for personal or financial
information nor click on any links within those solicitations, even if
they appear to be from an organization they trust.210 As part of an effort
to educate consumers, financial institutions should direct their
customers to these resources, develop their own informational material,
or even consider a campaign similar to Target’s to disseminate the
information.211
Financial institutions should also focus on educating and
training employees.212 Although the majority of financial institutions
already train employees on cybersecurity, the benefits of such training
increase when updated regularly and provided routinely.213 Financial
institutions should constantly provide employee security training, 214
and should regularly remind employees of what they should look for
with respect to security threats.215 An annual reminder to employees to
be vigilant is no longer sufficient.216 Instead, employees should be
reminded about the importance of security every time they log into the
system, such as through a pop-up notification requiring the user’s
acknowledgement before proceeding.217 At the very least, management
should brief employees about security concerns on a quarterly basis.218
Financial institutions should present information about cyberrisks in
layman’s terms so that the financial institution’s board of directors and
team members will understand what needs to occur to properly protect
against risk.219
18,
2014),
https://corporate.target.com/discover/article/Target-to-invest-5-million-incybersecurity-coalit.
209. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39.
210. Id.
211. Steinberg, supra note 7.
212. Crosman, supra note 201.
213. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 194, at 2.
214. Andy Peters, No One’s Safe from Cyberattacks: Former Wells Fargo CIO, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 29, 2014, at 6.
215. Crosman, supra note 201.
216. Peters, supra note 214.
217. Id.
218. Stewart, supra note 29.
219. Id.
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Financial institutions should establish programs to continuously
monitor network activity to ensure that security compromises do not go
undetected or unquestioned.220 In monitoring network activity, banks
should collect enough information about typical network activity so that
red flags will go up if a user abnormally accesses information
throughout the organization.221 At a minimum, the institution’s board of
directors or board of trustees should make sure that their institutions run
adequate tests on their security systems and review their security
policies annually.222 In addition, the most secure system should require
employees to present a thumbprint or facial scan as evidence of their
identity for authentication before accessing the network.223 Finally,
employees’ access to data and programs should be limited, allowing
them access only to the information that is essential for them to perform
their job functions.224
At many institutions, directors wait until the financial institution
suffers a cyberattack or attacks are otherwise widely reported to discuss
cybersecurity with management.225 However, routine discussions in
board and management meetings about cybersecurity issues would
strengthen risk management by building a security culture within the
institution.226 Although not mandatory, institutions should use the
Framework to assess their cybersecurity risk management and help
identify issues that may invite regulatory scrutiny.227 After conducting
the assessment, directors and management, particularly audit and risk
committees, should be briefed on the results.228
Financial institutions should also develop a protocol to notify
customers as soon as possible after detection of a breach.229 In May
2014, the White House released a report encouraging banks to inform
Americans when their information has been compromised or stolen.230
Crosman, supra note 201.
Id.
Stewart, supra note 29.
Crosman, supra note 201.
Id.
FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 194.
Id. at 3.
Crane, supra note 30.
Id.
JOHN PODESTA ET AL., BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 5 (2014).
230. Id. at 1.
220.
221.
222.
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224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
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The report recommended that Congress “pass legislation that provides
for a national data breach standard” and imposes a reasonable time
period for organizations to provide such notification.231 After a
cyberattack occurs, banks must disclose232 to customers that customer
data has been breached.233 But this process can take days or even
weeks.234 Oftentimes, financial institutions and companies like Target
do not immediately know what information is compromised or who is
affected.235 Cybercriminals will take advantage of these days or weeks
of uncertainty by initiating a series of identity-theft scams.236 Such
scams often include emails to customers in which criminals pretend to
be the financial institution whose security was compromised.237
Nervous consumers who believe the emails often divulge the requested
information and become victims of identity theft.238
A financial institution’s delay in disclosing a breach can end up
making the hacker’s attempts more successful by allowing these
nervous customers to become more at risk for identity theft.239
Financial institutions should have procedures in place for notifying
customers, regulators, and law enforcement when a cyberattack
occurs.240
Documentation of such procedures ensures timely
notification and to assist in prompt decision-making in the event of a
cyberattack.241
Third-party vendors also make financial institutions vulnerable
to cyberattacks.242 Institutions must examine their relationships with
Id. at 60.
Although companies must disclose information about a breach to customers, they
are not required to disclose any information that may provide a “roadmap” for hackers to
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these parties to identify all potential risks.243 For this reason, regulators
now encourage banks to increase their oversight of third-party
vendors.244 As “banks increasingly rely on third-party vendors,” outside
vendors are gaining access to large amounts of sensitive data.245 Some
small-market firms outsource all of their information technology
functions to third-party providers.246 While financial institutions can
outsource these functions, they cannot outsource the
risk.247
Outsourcing requires institutions to understand how risks are managed,
and banks must have a response plan implemented in the event that data
is lost or a cyberattack occurs.248
In addition to a bank’s cyberattack response plan, institutions
that use third-party vendors should ensure that any vendor they use has
a plan in place to respond to a cyberthreat.249 Therefore, before entering
into a contract, management should consider the potential risks in the
third-party’s systems and evaluate the third-party’s cybersecurity
practices.250 Financial institutions should also ensure that contracts with
third parties protect the bank if a security breach occurs as a result of
the relationship with the third-party.251 Financial institutions of all sizes
should use the Framework to convey cybersecurity risk management
requirements to all third-parties with which they work, including
providers of critical systems on which the institutions depend.252 Using
the Framework may help financial institutions avoid legal liability for
negligence related to third-party relationships.253
With cybersecurity incidents occurring more frequently,
financial institutions should obtain cyberinsurance coverage to help pay
the potentially massive costs that result from a data breach.254 While
Id.
Id.
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general insurance policies may not sufficiently cover data breaches,
additional stand-alone cyberinsurance plans are tailored to cover the
costs of a security breach including lost income, operating expenses,
and costs that arise arising out of third-party claims.255 In addition,
stand-alone cyberinsurance policies can provide coverage for both firstparty losses and third-party liability.256 Cyberinsurance policies may
cover a variety of costs associated with a data breach, such as legal and
investigative fees, crisis management costs, and losses due to business
interruption.257 Over 60% of risk management professionals whose
company has obtained a cyberinsurance policy believe that having the
insurance has improved their preparedness for handling cyberrisks.258
However, companies purchasing cyberinsurance should consider that
some policies require that legal representation come from a pre-selected
panel of attorneys, so the company may not be permitted to obtain topnotch counsel should a cyberattack occur.259
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent attack on JPMorgan highlighted the importance of
maintaining adequate cybersecurity practices for
financial
260
institutions. Today, financial institutions, no matter the size, are
almost certain to experience some type of cyberattack.261 These attacks
may occur through phishing, malware, or the unsecure networks of
third-party vendors.262 If successful, a single attack can cost an
institution hundreds of thousands of dollars in fraud losses and other
expenses.263 It may also result in a loss of customers264 and potential
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lawsuits.265 In response to the growing risk of cyberattacks, government
officials and agencies have developed assessments and other guidelines
to assist companies in protecting against the risk.266 Financial
institutions should use the newly available guidance to evaluate their
cybersecurity practices, identify weaknesses, and ensure that their
networks are adequately protected.267
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